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Abstract
We ﬁrst build a fair wage model in which effort varies over the business cycle.
This mechanism decreases the need for other sources of sluggishness to explain
the observed high inﬂation persistence. Second, we confront empirically our fair
wage model with a New Keynesian model based on the standard assumption of
monopolistic competition in the labor market. We show that, in terms of overall
ﬁt, the fair wage model outperforms the New Keynesian one. The extension of
the fair wage model with lagged wage is judged insigniﬁcant by the data, but the
extension based on a rent sharing argument including ﬁrm’s productivity gains in
the fair wage is not. Looking at the implications for monetary policy, we conclude
that the additional trade-off problem created by the inefﬁcient real wage behavior
signiﬁcantly affect nominal interest rates and inﬂation outcomes.
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Assuming that workers’ effort are affected by the wage paid by the ﬁrm, efﬁciency
wage theories have been judged to be very promising given the goal of understanding
labor market characteristics. These theories have ﬁrst been developed in static models,
explaining the existence of unemployment as a result of the optimal response of ﬁrms
to workers’ behavior. For instance, in the gift exchange model of Akerlof (1982), the
effort of an individual worker dependson a comparison between the current wage and
a norm which includes the salaries perceived by other workers, the level of unemploy-
ment and unemployment beneﬁts. The optimal response of the ﬁrm to this behavior
is to offer a wage above the market-clearing level in return for which workers would
provide a higher level of effort.
The view of labor relationships underlying the fair wage model is supported by a large
number of studies both in applied economics and experimental psychology. For exam-
ple Bewley (1998) interviewed business people, labor leaders and counselors of un-
employment people in the US to understand why wages were almost never declining.
The key result is that ﬁrms dislike pay cuts because they hurt morale. Good morale
promotes high productivity, and other beneﬁts such as less turnover, and a good com-
pany reputation that helps recruiting. Pay cuts hurt morale because of discomfort
from reduced living standards and because of an insult effect – workers associate pay
increases with approbation and reward.
While the efﬁciency wage literature was initially developed in a static framework Dan-
thine and Donaldson (1990) introduce it in a dynamic RBC model in order to assess
whether the efﬁciency wage mechanism can help explain the wage-employment puz-
zle. Their ﬁnding is that the structural unemployment generated this way does not
help to reduce the procyclicity of wages: as unemployment falls, effort tends to de-
crease and ﬁrms have to pay higher wages to maintain it. In the framework of the
gift-exchange model, Collard and de la Croix (2000) show that this negative relation-
ship between unemployment and wages can be attenuated by introducing a reference
to past wages.1 In this set-up, effort does not only depend on the wage comparison
with contemporaneous outside wage opportunities but also on the comparison with
the workers’ own lagged wage. This kind of argument is often used in the literature
to motivate a role for a real wage rigidity in the wage equation. It reduces the coun-
tercyclical behavior of effort as the latter is not only raising with unemployment but
also with wage increases. Danthine and Kurmann (2004) embed this idea into a New
Keynesian general equilibrium model to analyze labor market and inﬂation dynamics.
Their framework displays a series of interesting properties. Most importantly, the real
rigidities implied by efﬁciency wages interact with nominal rigidities in such a way
that the effect of monetary shocks on output is ampliﬁed and more persistent than in
other monetary business cycle models. On the whole, this model indicates that the fair
1In the context of a shirking model, Alexopoulos (2004) breaks the procyclicality of wages by pay-
ing shirkers only a fraction of their wage instead of ﬁring them. This way, the cost of being caught
shirking is not reduced by the situation on the labor market in periods of high activity and effort is less
countercyclical.
1wage approach constitutes a promising platform for a more complete New Keynesian
synthesis.
In this paper, we pursue along this line by explicitly confronting the fair wage model
with the standard New Keynesian model with sticky price and wages, in order to iden-
tify which features of the model are preferred by the data. We adopt an effort speciﬁ-
cation which is sufﬁciently general to allow effort to vary over the business cycle. This
speciﬁcation contrasts with the previous studies which selected a logarithmic effort
function so that the Solow condition, characterizing the optimal ﬁrm behavior, implied
a constant effort level. In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we derive the theoretical properties
of this effort speciﬁcation in a simple RBC-type model for which we get closed form
solution. In particular we assess how each parameter of the effort function affects the
elasticity of real wages with respect to aggregate unemployment, and how this elas-
ticity modiﬁes the inﬂation persistence. Combining our result for the fair wage model
with those of B´ enassy (2004) for a model with a competitive labor market, we show
that there exist parametrizations of the effort function for which the fair wage model
generates more ”endogenous price stickiness”. This results contradicts the criticism
formulated by Kiley (1997) against the efﬁciency wage assumption.
The ultimate test for our fair wage model is to confront it to the data. In a second step,
we introduce our effort speciﬁcation in a more complete DSGE model ` a la Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2003, 2006). In addition, sticky
nominal wage setting is introduced in order to compare the fair wage model with the
standard New Keynesian model with sticky prices and wages. Variable effort affects
the estimates of the total factor productivity process (see Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (1993) for a discussion) but also the correct measure of the marginal cost that
drives the price setting of the ﬁrms. Wage ﬂuctuations are partially compensated by
the endogenous effort ﬂuctuations, so that the sensitivity of the marginal cost to output
and employment variations is decreased. This mechanism can potentially decrease the
need for nominal price stickiness to explain the observed low elasticity of inﬂation to
output variations.
Two extensions of the fair wage model are considered. The ﬁrst one follows the argu-
ment of Collard and de la Croix (2000)and Danthine and Kurmann (2004), by consider-
ing lagged wages in the effort speciﬁcation. The second extension is based on Danthine
and Kurmann (2005) and argues for a rent sharing argument in the effort speciﬁcation.
Here, workers effort decision depends also on the fair treatment within the ﬁrm in the
sense that workers expect to share in the productivity gains that are realized within the
ﬁrm.
Finallywestudytheimplicationsofthe effortspeciﬁcation formonetarypolicy. Theex-
ternality effect of aggregate wages and employment on the effort decision implies that
the decentralized economy is characterized by an inefﬁcient high level of unemploy-
ment. In addition, output and employment dynamics in the decentralized economy
deviate from the optimal response of the economy. Indeed a social planner would take
into account these externality effects of the wage and employment decisions. There-
fore, a monetary policy that concentrates on stabilizing the inﬂation process, results in
2an output and employment response that deviate from the welfare optimal response.
In that sense, monetary policy is faced with a trade-off problem between inﬂation sta-
bilization on the one hand and output and employment gap stabilization on the other
hand very much in the spirit of the Blanchard and Gali (2005) argument based on a
real wage rigidity assumption. Our estimated model allows to evaluate the empirical
relevance of this trade-off issue.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we derive the properties of the fair
wage assumption in a simple general equilibrium model for which we get closed form
solution. In Section 2, our modeling strategy is introduced in a more complete DSGE
model, which allows us to evaluate the gain from our speciﬁcation compared to the
existing Smets and Wouters model. Section 3 draws lessons for monetary policy. Sec-
tion 4 concludes.
1 Theoretical Implications of the Fair Wage Hypothesis
The objective of this section is to analyze how efﬁciency wage considerations mod-
ify real wage rigidity, unemployment, and the response of the economy to monetary
shocks. In particular, we look at the interactions between real wage rigidities and in-
ﬂation persistence. Accordingly, we model efﬁciency wages within an otherwise stan-
dard dynamic model with price staggering ` a la Calvo (1983). We follow closely the
method developed by B´ enassy (2004) who studies the effect of competitiveness on the
good market and price stickiness. Closed form solutions can be obtained within a dy-
namic model under the following assumptions: logarithmic utility, no capital stock,
multiplicative monetary shock. We can then study the link between the parameters
of interest and a measure of inﬂation persistence. Notice that in this section, nominal
stickiness only concerns prices; nominal wages can be freely reset every period. This
assumption will be lifted in Section 2, where both prices and wages will be subject to
Calvo’s staggering.
1.1 Households
Effort at work has consequences in terms of utility. In fair wage models, utility is
negatively related to the distance between the effort provided by household j, denoted
et(j), and the effort judged fair by the household e⋆
t(j): [et(j) − e⋆
t(j)]
2 . In its simple
form, the fair effort is a function of the real wage of the household wt(j), of labor
market tightness and of the aggregate wage in the economy wt:
e⋆








t − (φ0 − φ2 − φ3)
ψ
with the following parameter restrictions:






Figure 1: Iso-effort lines
φ0 and φ1 are scale parameters. Nt is the aggregate employment rate, i.e. the average
fraction of household’s members having a job. The parameter φ2 measures the effect
of the tightness of the labor market on individual effort.2 The parameter φ3 describes
to which extent workers are sensitive to the alternative wage, i.e. the wage they could
earn on average in the rest of the economy. Notice that φ2 and φ3 determine the in-
ﬂuence of two aggregate variables on the ﬁrm; the relative importance of these two
externalities will turn out to be important when we will discuss policy implications.
Finally, the parameter ψ describes the substitutability between the different elements
in the effort function. To understand its role suppose that the ﬁrm faces a rise in the
aggregate employment level. At given wage, effort tends to diminish since external
conditions have improved. The increase in the local wage which is required to keep
effort constant is higher if ψ is large. This is illustrated in Figure 1. On the contrary, if
aggregate employment decreases, only a small reduction in wage keeps effort constant
when ψ is large.
This effort function is a generalization of the logarithmic function found in the existing
literature:
Lemma 1 For ψ → 0 and φ0 = 1, effort is given by:
e⋆
t(j) = φ1 (lnwt(j) − φ2 ln Nt − φ3 lnwt).
Proof: Compute the limit of e⋆
t(j) when ψ → 0 using l’Hospital rule. ￿
Introducing effort into an otherwise standard money-in-the-utility function, the prob-
lem of the household is to maximize
∑ βt
 




2We have preferred a formulation with (1/(1 − Nt))ψ to one with N
ψ
t to guarantee that the equilib-
rium Nt is always below 1.
4subject to the constraint:
Ptct(j) + mt(j) = Ptwt(j)nt(j) + Πt + µtmt−1(j).
nt(j) is the fraction of family members working at date t, Πt denotes nominal dis-
tributed proﬁts, and µt is a multiplicative shock affecting all existing money balances.
The above formulation differs from the standard RBC model in one important point:
labor does not enter in the utility function. This implies that the main mechanism at
work will not be the standard intertemporal labor substitution effect usually driving
RBC models. In this class of models the household supplies inelastically one unit of
time, and only a fraction of time is employed by the ﬁrm. We call nt(j) this fraction of
time. One important point is that the utility drawn from the job itself is separable from
the utility drawn from consumption so that effort is independent of wealth.













σ/mt(j) = λt(j) − βEt [(λt+1(j)µt+1]






The ﬁrst equation gives optimal effort as a function of real wages and employment
rate. The second and third equations can be combined into
mt(j)
Ptct(j)






The only solution to this difference equation which satisﬁes the transversality condi-







1.2 Final Output Firms
Final output is produced with a combination of intermediate inputs yi by competitive
ﬁrms. Their production function is:
Yt =





5The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is 1/(1 − θ) with θ ∈ (0,1).
The parameter θ can be seen as an index of competitiveness. Each competitive ﬁrm
maximizes proﬁts:
Pt =















The aggregate price Pt is a CES index of the intermediate good prices:
Pt =





1.3 Intermediate Good Firms
Given the demand yt(i), an intermediate ﬁrm hires labor input nt(i) and requests effort
level et(i) to produce the demanded quantity through the following technology:
yt(i) = A(et(i)nt(i))
α . (6)
The parameter A is an index of productivity. With marginal decreasing returns (α < 1),
marginal productivity differs across ﬁrms as soon as employment differ across them
(as in Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001)). The intermediate ﬁrm minimizes costs
wt(i)nt(i) subject to technology (6) and effort (1). First order conditions are:
wt(i) = Aνt(i)αyt(i)/nt(i)
nt(i) = Aνt(i)α[yt(i)/et(i)] [φ1wt(i)ψ−1]
where νt(i) is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the production constraint. 1/νt(i)
is also the markup over marginal cost. Combining the two conditions we obtain
et(i) = φ1wt(i)ψ. (7)
We deduce from this equation the following result.
Proposition 1 (Effort and wages) Optimal effort set by ﬁrms is given by equation (7). It is
constant if ψ = 0. Otherwise, there is a positive relation in equilibrium between effort and
wages.
6The intuition behind the above Proposition goes as follows. Firms increase wages up
to the point where any marginal gain in effort is offset by an increase in the wage bill.
This is translated into the condition that the elasticity of effort to wages should be
equal to 1 in equilibrium (which is called in the literature the Solow (1979) condition).
In the case ψ = 0, i.e. when the effort function is logarithmic, this elasticity condition
is equivalent to imposing a constant effort (et(i) = φ1). Any negative shock to effort,
such as a rise in aggregate employment, is met by a rise in the ﬁrms wage so as to keep
effort constant. When ψ > 0, i.e., when wages and employment are high substitute
in the effort function, the elasticity condition is no longer equivalent to keeping effort
constant. Any rise in aggregate employment is also met by a rise in the ﬁrms wage; if
the wage is raised up to the point where effort stays constant, the elasticity of effort to
wages would stay above 1, giving an incentive to ﬁrms to raise wages above that point.
This arises because the derivative of effort with respect to wages decreases less fast
when ψ > 0. In some sense, the returns to wage in terms of effort are less decreasing.
This highlights that assuming logarithmic utility imposes a very strong restriction on
effort. Our generalization of the effort function allows for cases where effort varies
positively with wages.
We can now compute the aggregate wage. Equation (7) implies that the optimal ﬁrm















φ0 − φ2 − φ3
1− ψ
 1/ψ
which is the same in all ﬁrms. Hence we have wt(i) = wt and
wt = wt(i) =
 
φ2






φ0 − φ2 − φ3
1− ψ − φ3
 1/ψ
. (8)
For this aggregate wage to be well deﬁned, we need to make one of the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1 1− ψ − φ3 > 0.
Assumption 2 1− ψ − φ3 < 0 and φ0 − φ3 < 0.
Under Assumption 1, the real wage is deﬁned for any Nt ∈ ( ¯ N,1) with





if φ0 − φ2 − φ3 < 0
= 0 otherwise.
(9)
The real wage is an increasing function of the employment rate. Under Assumption 2,
it is deﬁned for any Nt ∈ (0, ¯ N) ⊂ (0,1). In that case, the real wage is a decreasing
function of the employment level. If neither Assumption 1, nor Assumption 2 holds,
7then the real wage is not deﬁned. It is interesting at this stage to remark the role played
by the parameter ψ. When ψ = 0, i.e. the effort function is logarithmic, the restriction
imposed byAssumption 1 isnot very strong. Indeed, φ3 is alwaysbelowone, reﬂecting
that the wage externality alone cannot overwhelm the direct effect of the ﬁrm’s wage
on effort. When ψ is positive, the story is different. The joint forces of the externality
(φ3) and the high substitution in the effort function (ψ) may in fact reverse the positive
relationship between wages and employment.
We can now deﬁne a concept of real rigidity as being the inverse of the sensitivity of
wages to employment. Loglinearizing the wage equation (8) around a steady state
(w, N), we ﬁnd:
ˆ wt =
φ2












      
≡Ω
ˆ Nt (10)
Where hatted variables denote deviations from steady state. Then Ω is the sensitivity
to employment and 1/Ω is real wage rigidity.
Proposition 2 (Real Wage Rigidity) Under Assumption 1, at given employment rate, real
wage rigidity (1/Ω) decreases with the relative sensitivity of effort to employment φ2.
It decreases with the relative importance of the externality φ3.
Real rigidity decreaseswith φ2: if φ2 is small, unemployment affects effort very slightly,
and wages do not need to be changed much to respond to changes in market tightness.
Real rigidity decreases with φ3: if the externality is large, spill-over effects between
ﬁrms are important, which act as a multiplier on the aggregate wage of small changes
in employment.
Under Assumption 2, equation (8) describes a negative relation between aggregate real
wages and the employment rate. This negative relation holds because ﬁrms can adjust
wages each period, implying that the full effect of the externality (φ3) is obtained al-
most instantaneously. The assumption that ﬁrms can change the wage at any moment
will be lifted in Section 2. We will there assume that only a fraction of ﬁrms choose the
nominal wage at a given point in time. This nominal sluggishness will delay the effect
of the externality, keeping a short run positive effect of employment on the real wage,
although the long-run effect remains negative.
We now derive the optimal price setting by the intermediate ﬁrm. At each time a
fraction 1 − ξp of ﬁrms sets a new price p⋆
t (i). This price still prevails in period s with
probability ξs−t
p . Nominal proﬁts at time s are:
Πs(i) = p⋆
t (i)ys(i) − wsPsns(i) = p⋆
t (i)ys(i) − wsPs[ys(i)]1/α[1/es(i)]
8with ns(i) = [ys(i)]1/α[1/es(i)]. The ﬁrm maximized the discounted ﬂow of expected
real proﬁts, multiplied by the marginal utility of consumption 1/Cs. We use the equi-





































































The optimal price p⋆
t (i) determined by this equation does not depend on i. All ﬁrms




Given that a fraction 1 − ξp of ﬁrms set a new price each year, the average price level
given in (5) follows:
P
θ/(θ−1)
t = (1 − ξp)(p⋆
t )θ/(θ−1) + ξpP
θ/(θ−1)
t−1 (12)




















t = (1 − ξp)(p⋆
t )1/(θ−1) + ξpX
1/(θ−1)
t−1 (14)
The equilibrium on the goods market implies
Yt = Ct. (15)
91.5 Inﬂation Stickiness
Suppose there is a steady state which is saddle-point stable. To study inﬂation stick-
iness, we log-linearize the model (see Appendix A) and study how monetary shocks
persist in the price system.
Proposition 3 After loglinearization around the steady state, the solution to equation (11) is
of the form:




bjEt ˆ Mt+j (16)
Inﬂation stickiness ρ increases with the Calvo probability ξp and increases with the degree
of real wage rigidity 1/Ω. At given rigidity 1/Ω, it also increases with ψ, the degree of
substitution between wage and employment in the effort function.
Proof: see Appendix A.
The parameter ρ is a good measure of inﬂation stickiness because we can write (16) as:
ˆ Pt − ˆ Pt−1 = ρ( ˆ Pt−1 − ˆ Pt−2) + (1 − ρ)( ˆ Mt − ˆ Mt−1)
Proposition 3 says that when wages and employment are highly substitute in the effort
function, effort co-moves with wages (equation (7)), the inﬂuence of the wage on the
marginal cost is compensated by changes in effort and inﬂation is more persistent.
Wemaycomparetheexpression computed for ρ totheexpression computed byB´ enassy
(2004) for this parameter under the assumption of a Walrasian labor market. From this
exercise we conclude that the fair wage model generates more endogenous price stick-
iness than the traditional competitive labor market model if
(1− ψ)Ω
ψΩ + 1
< σl + α
where σl is the inverse of elasticity of the work effort with respect to the real wage. This
condition is easily veriﬁed for ψ and φ3 relatively large. This proves that the result ob-
tained by Kiley (1997) that the efﬁciency wage assumption can never produce more
endogenous price rigidity than the competitive labor market assumption can be cir-
cumvented by considering a somewhat more general effort function, with high substi-
tution between wages and unemployment (ψ) and/or large enough wage externalities
(φ3).
1.6 Long-run Unemployment





10Equation (8) can be rewritten:
wψ =
φ0 − φ2 − φ3
1 − ψ − φ3
+
φ2





All ﬁrms are now alike so that
w = ναY/N
The optimal price setting rule (11) leads to:
ν = θ.
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1− ψ − φ3
  1
ψ
to +∞ as N goes from 0 to one. From these properties we can deduce that there is
always a unique solution to equation (17).
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, there is a unique steady state employment rate N which
satisﬁes equation (17). N is a positive function of competitiveness θ and productivity A. It
is a negative function of effort sensitivity to employment φ2. If φ0 ≥ 1 − ψ, it is a negative
function of the strength of the wage externality φ3.
Under Assumption 1, equation (17) can be interpreted within the usual textbook WS-
PS framework (left panel of Figure 2). The left hand side represents the PS curve (price-
determined real wage) and is a decreasing function of N. The right hand side repre-
sents the WS curve (wage-setting curve), it is increasing in N and represents the real
wage underlying the efﬁciency wage set-up. The PS curve depends on productivity A,
on competitiveness on the product market θ, and on φ1 which directly inﬂuences labor
productivity through the level of effort.
A rise in competitiveness reduces the markup of ﬁrms, shifts the PS curve to the right,
increases the level of employment and reduces unemployment. A rise in effort sensi-
tivity to employment shifts the WS curve to the left, which lowers employment. When
externalities are strong (φ3), the WS curve is higher and unemployment is higher too.
11N
w WS (φ2, φ3)






PS (A, θ, φ1)
1 ¯ N




PS (A, θ, φ1)
1 ¯ N
Assumption 2, φ1 large
Figure 2: Equilibrium Unemployment Rate
Under Assumption 2, the left hand side decreases monotonically from +∞ to ℓ as N
goes from 0 to one. The right hand side decreases monotonically from ı to 0 as N goes
from 0 to ¯ N, where ¯ N has been deﬁned in equation (9). From these properties we can
deduce that different cases are possible. Figure 2 represents two of them. In the top
right panel, there are two long-run employment equilibria. In the bottom panel, there
is none. One can move from the situation of the top panel to the one in the bottom
panel by raising the parameter φ1 (for example). Starting with a low value of φ1 and
two equilibria, raising φ1 progressively shifts the PS curve upward. There is one value
of φ1 for which the two curves are tangent to each other; this point is called a tangent
bifurcation (see de la Croix and Michel (2002)). The two equilibria collide and disap-
pear. For φ1 above this critical value, long-run equilibria do not exist any more. A
sharp characterization of this phenomenon using the tools of bifurcation theory is be-
yond the scope of this paper. In the applied model of Section 2 we can always choose
φ1 to guarantee the existence of a long-run equilibrium. From the estimation proce-
dure it appears that the larger steady state is saddle-point stable. Notice that some
comparative static results of Proposition 4 are reversed for the high steady state:
12Proposition 5 Under Assumption 2, assume that φ1 is low enough to guarantee the existence
of at least one steady state employment rate N.
(a) The largest equilibrium employment rate N is a negative function of competitiveness θ and
productivity A.
(b) It is a negative function of effort sensitivity to employment φ2. If φ0 ≥ 1− ψ, steady state
employment is always a positive function of the strength of the wage externality φ3.
Result (a) will turn out to be important to understand the effect of a productivity shock
on employment in Section 2.3 Result (b) comes from the fact that a rise in effort sen-
sitivity to employment shifts the WS curve downward, which decreases employment.
When externalities are strong (φ3), the WS curve moves upward and employment is
higher too.
1.7 Optimality
Following the discussion in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), it is clear that the two exter-
nalities which are present in the effort function have opposite effects on the long-run
employment outcome. The employment externality implies that ﬁrms do not take into
account the negative spillover effects of their employment decision on the general ef-
fort level in the economy. Under Assumption 1, neglecting this social cost leads to
overemployment. On the other hand, the wage externality implies that ﬁrms do not
take into account the negative spillover effect of their wage decision on the overall ef-
fort level. By increasing the opportunity wage for workers, the decentralized wage
policy results in higher wages than is socially optimal. The net outcome of the two
externalities depends on the relative size of the parameters φ2 and φ3, but in general
the outcome under the decentralized economy does not equal the social optimal em-
ployment rate.
2 Fair Wages in a New Keynesian DSGE
In this section we introduce the fair wage model into the standard New Keynesian
model with sticky prices and wages of Smets and Wouters (2003). This model is sig-
niﬁcantly richer than the stylized framework developed in the previous version: it
has physical capital, nominal wage stickiness ` a la Calvo, and a monetary policy rule ` a
la Taylor. It also includes some additional propagation mechanisms such as external
habit formation, adjustment costs on investment in physical capital and costly variable
degree of capital utilization.
3Although we shall compute the impulse response function of employment to a temporary produc-
tivity shock, this shock is persistent enough to deliver results close to those of a permanent change in
productivity, as the one highlighted in Proposition 5.
132.1 Households
Compared to the previous section, we generalize the instantaneous utility function
of each household j by including an external habit variable (Ht) and by allowing the
intertemporal elasticity of consumption to be different from one. Therefore the instan-













where σc determines the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The external habit
variable is assumed to be proportional to aggregate past consumption: Ht = hCt−1.




























t an i.i.d.-Normal error term
We introduced a stochastic component ε
ef
t reﬂecting stochastic shifts in the effort sup-
ply preferences. The shock ε
ef
t is assumed to be an ARMA(1,1) process with an i.i.d.-





βt   Ut(j).
Household’s total income consists of three components: labor income plus the net cash
inﬂows from participating in state-contingent securities Λt(j), the return on the capital
stock diminished of the cost Ψ(ut(j)) associated with variations in the degree of capital
utilization ut(j) and the dividends derived from the imperfect competitive intermedi-
ate ﬁrms described in the intermediate retail ﬁrms subsection below:






State-contingent securities insure households against variations in household speciﬁc
labor income sothat the ﬁrst term in the total income isequaltoaggregate labor income
and the marginal utility of wealth is identical across households.
Households maximize their objective function subject to an intertemporal budget con-





















t an i.i.d.-Normal error term
Households hold their ﬁnancial wealth in the form of domestic bonds Bt. Bonds are
one period securities with a nominal rate of return Re
t which is affected by a risk pre-
mium onbondholdingsrepresented bythe AR(1)shock εb
t. Householdsdecideontheir
optimal consumption, bonds holding and effort. They also choose the capital stock,
investment and capital utilisation in order to maximise their intertemporal objective
function subject to the intertemporal budget constraint and the capital accumulation
equation given by
Kt = Kt−1 (1 − τ) + εi






t an i.i.d.-Normal error term
where It is the gross investment, τ is the depreciation rate, S( ) is an adjustment cost
function increasing with changes in investment and εi
t represents an investment spe-
ciﬁc technology shock.
2.2 Firms
As in Smets and Wouters (2003), ﬁrms decide on the quantities of labor and capital
services to rent and they set prices optimally. However, in the efﬁciency wage set up,
they also decide on wages. In the sequel of the paper, we leave the ﬂexible wage as-
sumption of the previous section and introduce nominal wage rigidities ` a la Calvo. In
order to circumvent aggregation problems, we modify the structure of the production
sector as follows.
Intermediate producers operate in a competitive market. They hire capital and labor,
and manage effort through their wage policy. Wages are assumed sticky. These ﬁrms
sell their output to intermediate retail ﬁrms who buy the homogeneous intermediate
products and transform them one-to-one into a differentiated product. The retail ﬁrms
operate on a monopolistically competitive market with sticky prices. They sell their
output to the ﬂexible price ﬁnal good sector whose ﬁrms act on a competitive mar-
ket. The ﬁnal good is an homogeneous good serving for consumption and investment
purposes.
The distinction between the ﬁrms producing the intermediate goods and the monop-
olistically competitive retail ﬁrms allows to separate the price and wage setting deci-
sions. Furthermore, if intermediate producers act on a competitive market, it results in
the very convenient feature that intermediate producers share the same homogeneous
marginal cost.
152.2.1 Final Output Firms
Final output ﬁrms are as described in subsection 1.2. Hence equations (3) to (5) hold.















t an i.i.d.-Normal error term
where the stochastic parameter εθ
t represents the time-varying markup in the goods
market. Shocks to this parameter are interpreted as cost-push shocks to the inﬂation
equation.
2.2.2 Intermediate Retail Firms
Intermediate retail ﬁrms indexed by h ∈ [0,1] face a demand for their product repre-
sented by equation (4). Given this demand, they buy homogenous intermediate prod-
ucts at a price Zt and transform them one-to-one into a differentiated product, incur-
ring a ﬁxed cost Φ. Current nominal proﬁts of intermediate retail ﬁrms can therefore
be written as:
Πs(h) = (pt(h) − Zt)   yt(h) − ZtΦ
We now derive the optimal price setting by the intermediate ﬁrm. At each time t a
fraction 1 − ξp of ﬁrms sets a new price p⋆
t (h). This price still prevails in period s with
probability ξs−t
p . Firms that do not reset their price, index it to a weighted average of
past inﬂation πt−1(h) and trend inﬂation π
pt(h) = pt−1(h)   π
γp
t−1   π1−γp
The price-setting ﬁrm maximizes the discounted ﬂow of expected real proﬁts, using a
discounting rate βρt consistent with the pricing kernel for nominal returns used by the
shareholders-households: ρt+s =
λt+s



























with   p⋆
t = p⋆
t /Pt and zt = Zt/Pt. Note that the h index has disappeared since all the
ﬁrms that set an optimal price at the same period share the same expected sequence of
real production costs.
















There is a continuum of competitive intermediate producers indexed by i ∈ [0,1].
Each ﬁrm hires labor input, capital input and request effort level et(i) to produce qt(i)





t is the productivity shock assumed to follow an AR(1) process with an i.i.d.-
normal error term and κt(i) is the effectively utilized capital stock given by κt(i) =
utKt−1(i). Real proﬁts are
ztqt(i) − wt(i)nt(i) − rk
tκt(i)
Proﬁt maximization results in an optimal demand for capital and labor. As the in-
termediate good producers act on a competitive market, they all share the same real
marginal cost












α−α(1 − α)−(1−α) (18)
Therefore, the wage per efﬁcient unit of labor is identical through ﬁrms i. The com-
bination of the optimal demand for capital and (18) yields that all the intermediate
producers share the same capital-efﬁcient labor ratio. This implies that the ﬁrst order
conditions for capital and labor may be aggregated over the intermediate ﬁrms.4
Let us consider that ﬁrms can only reset their nominal wage with a Calvo probability
1 − ξw. Furthermore, the ﬁrms that do not optimize their wage index it to a weighted
average of past inﬂation and trend inﬂation so that
Wt(i) = Wt−1(i)   π
γw
t−1   π1−γw












t (i)nt+s(i)   Πs−1
l=0π
γw


























Firms decide on their wage in order to optimize the effort response of their workers
over the expected contract length. Given that a fraction 1−ξw of ﬁrms sets a new wage
each period and that the complementary proportion indexes it, the average wage level
can be described as
Wt = ξw  Wt−1   π
γw
t−1   π1−γw + (1 − ξw)  W⋆
t (20)
4This point is important since it also implies that all the ﬁrms that re-set optimally their wage at a
given period choose the same wage (cf. appendix B)
172.3 Monetary Policy
In contrast with the ﬁrst section, the monetary authorities are assumed to follow a
generalized Taylor rule, responding gradually to deviations of inﬂation with respect
to the steady-state inﬂation and to level and growth rate deviations of the output gap
ˆ Yt − ˆ Y
p
t . Written in percentage deviation from steady-state, the generalized Taylor rule
is of the form
ˆ Rt = ρ  




rπ ˆ πt + ry




















t an i.i.d.-Normal error term
The monetary policy rule is affected by a persistent interest rate shock εr
t, assumed to
follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process.
The output gap is deﬁned as the difference between actual and potential output. The
actual output is represented by the ﬁnal good sector output (equation (3)). This ﬁ-
nal good serves for consumption and investment purposes, as well as for government
spending and to pay the capacity utilization adjustment costs:
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + Ψ(ut)Kt−1









t an i.i.d.-Normal error term
The potential output is deﬁned consistently with the DSGE model developed above.
It is the output that would prevail in the economy with ﬂexible prices and wages in
absence of the inefﬁcient cost-push shocks.
2.4 Estimation Results
Themodelpresentedaboveisﬁrstloglinearizedaroundasteadystate(seeAppendixB).
Next, the loglinearized equations are used to estimate the parameters with a Bayesian
full information approach following the applications in Smets and Wouters (2003) and
(2005). Data are for the Euro zone and the estimation period is 1974:1-2005:4. The
seven macroeconomic time series used for estimation are the growth rate in real GDP,
consumption, investment, real wages, the inﬂation rate in the GDP deﬂator, the short
term interest rate and employment. These variables allow us to identify the seven
structural shocks that appear in the model: the total factor productivity shock, the
investment-speciﬁc technology shock, the public spending shock, the risk premium
shock, the price markup shock, the monetary policy shock and a preference shock af-
fecting the efﬁciency wage (replacing the wage markup shock in the standard New
Keynesian model). A limited number of structural parameters, which are very poorly
identiﬁed by our estimation strategy, are ﬁxed at standard values (see Appendix C).
Two parameters of the effort function (φ0 and φ1) serve to scale the steady state so that
the unemployment rate is 5 percent and the effort level is one. All the other param-
eters are estimated, together with the constant trend growth rate and inﬂation rate.
18The prior distribution around the parameters are the ones used in Smets and Wouters
(2006). In order to compare the fair wage model with the standard New Keynesian
model with labor in the utility function and a wage markup shock, we also reestimate
this standard model on the same dataset and consider this as the reference point in
further discussions.
2.4.1 Estimated Parameters and Marginal Likelihood of the Model
The estimation results are displayed in Table 1. The estimates for most of the param-
eters in the fair wage model and the standard New Keynesian model are close and
similar to the previous estimation outcomes reported in the literature. However, there
are also some interesting differences. Looking ﬁrst at the stochastic shock processes, it
is not surprising that the estimated standard error of the total-factor productivity shock
is lower in the fair-wage model. In line with the arguments in Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (1993) and Basu (1996), the magnitude of this productivity shock is lower
after accounting for the variable effort level in the production process. Additionally,
the estimated ﬁxed costs in the production function is lower in the fair wage model and
this reduces further the role of the total factor productivity shock in the model. The es-
timated processes for the markup price shock and the wage shock also change: the
standard errors increase but the shocks become less persistent in the fair wage setup.
As a consequence, the contribution of these shocks to the inﬂation dynamics, especially
over a longer horizon, decreases. This result indicates that the persistence of inﬂation
is better captured in the fair wage model.
In terms of the behavioral parameters, there is a noticeable decline in the capital ad-
justment cost and the habit parameter in the fair-wage model: both consumption and
investment have a quicker but less persistent response to all types of shocks and espe-
cially to innovations in the interest rate. The lower intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution (inverse of σc) further reduces the impact of interest rate shocks. The estimated
price and wage Calvo parameters are very similar in the two models. The implied av-
erage duration of the price contract remain very high (more than two years) despite
the argument of Proposition 3 that the endogenous effort reaction would stabilize the
marginal cost sufﬁciently to allow for a lower Calvo parameter. The posterior estimate
for the wage stickiness is very similar to the prior distribution, illustrating the lack of
information in the data for estimating this parameter. It is interesting to note that a
lower prior on wage stickiness results in a lower posterior estimate as well without
affecting strongly the posterior probability of the overall model. However, in that case
the estimated parameters for the effort function are different and in line with a higher
real wage rigidity that substitutes for the nominal stickiness. The estimated policy rule
is also very similar in both models. The extreme case of completely ﬂexible wages is
strongly rejected by the data.
Let us ﬁnally consider the parameters describing the labor supply and effort decision.
In the benchmark New Keynesian model, the elasticity of labor supply is relatively
low (1/2.92). In the fair wage model, the effort equation replaces the labor supply
19term in the utility function. The estimated elasticity of substitution between wages
and employment in the effort function is ψ = 0.36. Since ψ is signiﬁcantly above 0,
the general power function for effort that allows effort to vary over the business cycle
is not rejected by the data. The effect of the labor market tightness on the effort level
is small but signiﬁcant (implied φ2 = 0.0045), while the coefﬁcient on the aggregate
wage is relatively high (φ3 = 0.795). The restricted version where the coefﬁcient on the
aggregate wage is ﬁxed to one and equal to the effect of the worker’s own wage on his
effort decision is in fact slightly preferred by the data. This version of the model will
be used in our discussion of the monetary policy implications in Section 3 because it
simpliﬁes drastically the solution of the social planner problem. Finally, remark that
Assumption 2 holds: 1−ψ−φ3 < 0. Aggregate wage externalities and substitutability
in the effort function are so strong that the underlying long-run wage setting curve is
negatively sloped. As explained after Proposition 2, this property is mitigated by the
wage nominal sluggishness which delivers a positively sloped wage curve.
The quality of the overall ﬁt of the two models is measured by the marginal likelihood
of the models. The fair wage model is able to outperform the New Keynesian model.
This difference can be translated in a strong posterior odd ratio of 0.999 in favor of the
fair wage model for an equal prior probability of the two models.
2.4.2 Impulse Response Function
To compare the dynamics in the two models we consider three impulse response func-
tions more in detail. Figure 3 in Appendix D plots the impulse response function for
a monetary policy shock in the fair wage model and in the benchmark New Keyne-
sian model. First of all, it is clear from this graph that the real effect of the monetary
policy shock on aggregate demand and employment is much less persistent in the fair
wage model. This result reﬂects the change in the estimated parameters that govern
the persistence in aggregate demand, and also the fact that the interest shock is less
persistent in the fair wage model. The second and more important observation is that
the responses of the real wage and the inﬂation rate to the monetary policy shock are
very similar in the fair wage model and in the benchmark model. Combined, these two
ﬁndings imply that the real wage reaction to changes in the labor market situation is
much more persistent inthe fairwagemodel compared tothe modelwith monopolistic
competition. This illustrates clearly how our fair wage model is able to generate a very
high real wage rigidity, a mechanism that is absent in the standard New Keynesian
model.
This persistence in the wage response results from the combination of wage staggering
with the externality of the aggregate wage on effort. Following a restrictive monetary
policy, theeffort ofworkers tendstoincreaseasareaction on the higherunemployment
risk. Firms that get the opportunity to adjust their wage tend to decrease the wage in
order to manage the optimal employment/effort input-mix. In the consecutive peri-
ods, the decrease in the aggregate wage erodes the impact of the ﬁrm speciﬁc wage via
5The coefﬁcient φ′
2 reported in Table 1 to 3 is equal to the expression φ2 (1/((1− N)w))ψ N/(1− N).
20the externality effect and effort raises above the ﬁrm’s optimal level again, leading to
further wage declines. This process stabilizes only slowly over time as lower wages
and marginal costs cause an increase in the markup of the sticky price ﬁnal good sec-
tor and stimulate supply, while at the same time there is a substitution effect towards
labor which also reduces the unemployment risk. As a result, real wages fall as long as
employment is below its steady state level. The same proﬁle in the employment-wage
reaction is present in the other ‘demand’ type shocks like the risk-premium shock, the
public spending shock and the investment-speciﬁc technology shock.
Figure 4summarizestheimpulseresponses followingatotal-factor productivity shock.
Aggregate demand increases only gradually following the shock, and therefore ﬁrms
have to lower their demand for labor. The decline in employment stimulates the effort
supply and given the efﬁcient effort condition, the real wage also increases. Compared
to the benchmark New Keynesian model, output and real wages increase much less
in the fair-wage model and most strikingly employment declines persistently. While
in the standard model, the equalization of the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and goods to the real wage implies that employment returns to the steady state
level, no such stabilizing mechanism is present in the fair wage model and ﬂuctuations
in the employment rate can be very persistent. Moreover in the fair wage model, the
moderate increase in the real wage is partially compensated by higher effort levels so
that the marginal cost and inﬂation is signiﬁcantly lower compared to the benchmark
New Keynesian model.
The impulse response functions to the effort shock are very similar to the responses
to the wage shock in the standard New Keynesian model (Figure 5). Although the ef-
fort shock in the fair wage model reduces basically to an i.i.d. shock, while the wage
markup shock has a higher persistence in the standard model, the impact on the real
wage is very similar as a result of the higher persistence in wages in the fair wage ver-
sion. Inﬂation is slightly less affected in the fair wage model due to the compensating
effort reaction to wage ﬂuctuations. The same divergence for the inﬂation response is
observed for the price markup shock: the inﬂation reaction is also less persistent in the
fair wage model.
2.4.3 Alternative Speciﬁcations of the Effort Function
In the literature on efﬁciency wages, different speciﬁcations for the effort function have
been considered. Following the negative conclusions about the potential of the efﬁ-
ciency wage models to generate sufﬁcient real wage rigidity, Collard and de la Croix
(2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004) considered an optimal effort function that
reacts on lagged wages instead of the contemporaneous wage. Once the lagged wage
appears in the effort decision, the models with efﬁciency wages are able to generate the
observed real wage rigidity. Alternatively, Danthine and Kurmann (2005) consider an
effort function derived from the reciprocity motive of economic agents, that depends
on the ﬁrm internal productivity level. The worker’s effort decision depends not only
on external opportunity wage considerations, but also on internal rent-sharing argu-
ments. This reciprocity relationship between ﬁrms and workers ﬁnd support in a vast
21body of microeconomic empirical evidence (Blanchﬂower, Oswald, and Garrett (1990)
and Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002)). Given our reduced form setup for the op-
timal effort function, we can easily extend our speciﬁcation to incorporate these addi-
tional arguments in our estimated model (cf. appendix B.2). The estimation results for
these two generalizations are summarized in Table 2.
We found no empirical support for the speciﬁcation with lagged wages as additional
reference variable in the effort function: the coefﬁcient on the lagged wage term is not
signiﬁcantly different from zero and the marginal likelihood of the extended model de-
teriorates. Given the sticky nominal wage assumption in our model, there is no need
for adding more dynamics in the effort function. In fact the sticky wage assumption
already produces a gradual adjustment of the aggregate reference wage to the newly
optimized wages and in so doing provides the necessary persistence in the wage dy-
namicsasobserved in thevarious impulseresponse functions discussed before. The re-
sults for the model with a ﬁrm-internal rent-sharing argument performs slightly better
than the baseline fair wage speciﬁcation and the coefﬁcient on this term is marginally
signiﬁcant and substitutes for the impact of the aggregate wage on effort.
3 Monetary Policy Implications
In this model, optimal monetary policy deﬁned from the household welfare perspec-
tive should consider not only the costs of price and wage inﬂation and the cost of
ﬂuctuations in the natural output gap, but it should also take into account the in-
efﬁciencies in the wage and employment decisions that result from the externalities
present in the workers effort decisions. These externalities create a wedge between the
natural output, that is the outcome in the decentralized model assuming ﬂexible price
and wages, and the ﬁrst best efﬁcient output that would be attainable for the social
planner. As argued in section 1.7, the difference between the natural and the efﬁcient
output and employment outcomes depend on the relative size of the two externalities.
These differences can now be evaluated for the estimated models. In order to simplify
the discussion, we concentrate on the model with φ3 restricted to one, that is the effort
equation with an impact of aggregate wages equal to the impact of the worker speciﬁc
wage, so that the wage plays only a distributive role in the social planner solution.
In terms of steady state levels, it turns out that for the estimated parameters the ﬁrst
best efﬁcient output and employment rate is higher than in the natural economy: the
efﬁcient employment rate turns out to be 0.98 against the natural rate of 0.95. The
decentralized wage decision results in a too high wage by neglecting the externality
effect on aggregate wages and this channel dominates the impact of the aggregate em-
ployment externality on effort and the wage decision. From the monetary policy point
of view, this inefﬁciency in the decentralized steady state level is imposed and mon-
etary policy is unable to affect these permanent steady state levels. However, more
relevant for monetary policy is the wedge between the dynamic response in the ﬁrst
22best efﬁcient problem and the response under the decentralized setting.6 Here, mone-
tary policy can contribute to welfare maximization by stabilizing the gap between the
dynamic responses. Stabilization of this efﬁcient output gap appears as an additional
target for monetary policy and the important question then is to evaluate the empirical
relevance of this trade-off.
In our evaluation of the trade-off problem, we concentrate on the dynamic responses
of the productivity shock. By far this shock creates the most important divergence be-
tween the efﬁcient and the natural output and employment ﬂuctuations. The ﬁrst best
allocation implies that employment and effort remain constant at their efﬁcient steady
state level following any shock to the economy. The result is a strong increase in the
efﬁcient output following the productivity shock (see Figure 6). On the other hand,
the natural output reaction in the decentralized setup is characterized by a persistent
negative decline in employment and a more moderate increase in output. From this it
is immediately clear that it makes a crucial difference for monetary policy which of the
two output concepts is taken into account in its policy decision. In order to illustrate
the importance also for the inﬂation outcomes, we compare in Figure 6 the impact of a
productivity shock under the estimated policy rule, based on the natural output gap,
and compare this with the same rule where the natural gap is replaced with the efﬁ-
cient gap. If monetary policy takes into account the higher efﬁcient output response
to the productivity shock, it lowers the real interest rate much more aggressively and
this results in a positive inﬂation response instead of the estimated negative impulse-
response on inﬂation. Similar differences appear if we consider optimal monetary pol-
icy rules, instead of estimated instrument rules, with different output gap concepts
in the objective function. These ﬁndings are in line with the results in Blanchard and
Gali (2006). They consider the impact of real wage rigidity resulting from the bargain-
ing process in a search and matching model of the labor market. They also conclude
that the additional trade-off problem for monetary policy created by the inefﬁcient real
wage behavior is potentially important for the inﬂation outcome.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we considered efﬁciency wages along the gift-exchange argument in an
otherwise standard DSGE model, byallowing effort ofthe workers todependon work-
ers’ own wage, the average alternative wage and the employment rate in the economy
(Akerlof (1982), Danthine and Donaldson (1990)). In addition sticky nominal wage
setting is introduced in order to compare the fair wage model with the standard New
Keynesian model with sticky price and wages. Contrary to the previous studies which
selected an effort function implying constant effort over the business cycle, our effort
speciﬁcation is sufﬁciently general to allow effort to vary over the business cycle. We
showed that, when effort is variable, wage ﬂuctuations are partially compensated by
6SeeGali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido(2005)for a discussion of the welfarecosts of cyclical ﬂuctuations
in the output gap, and Blanchard and Gali (2005) for a discussion of the monetary policy implications.
23the endogenous effort ﬂuctuations, so that the sensitivity of the marginal cost to output
and employment variations is decreased. This mechanism decreases the need for nom-
inal price stickiness to explain the observed low elasticity of inﬂation to output vari-
ations. However, the ﬁtted nominal price stickiness in the baseline fair-wage model
remains very high, basically because of the productivity shocks that have a direct im-
pact on the marginal cost. Therefore, these shocks would lead to large price effects in a
model with more ﬂexible prices. Note however, that this result is in line with evidence
from SVAR exercises claiming that prices react more strongly to productivity shocks
than to demand shocks (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson 2003).
In terms of overall empirical ﬁt, the fair wage model outperforms the standard New
Keynesian model as estimated in Smets and Wouters (2003) in which the real wage
is determined by the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption.
Two extensions of the fair wage model have been considered. The ﬁrst one follows
the argument of Collard and de la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004), by
considering lagged wages in the effort speciﬁcation. In this set-up, effort does not only
depend on wage comparisons with contemporaneous outside wage opportunities but
also on comparisons with the workers’ own lagged wage. Estimates of this extended
effort speciﬁcation in our model does not indicate an important role for this additional
real wage rigidity argument. The second extension is based on Danthine and Kurmann
(2005) and argues for a rent sharing argument in the effort speciﬁcation. Here, workers
effort decision depends also on the fair treatment within the ﬁrm in the sense that
workers expect to share in the productivity gains that are realized within the ﬁrm. Our
estimation results conﬁrm that there is some role for internal rent sharing.
The importance of the labor market structure for welfare analysis and monetary policy
conclusions was already stressed recently by Levin et al. (2005) within the context of
a New Keynesian model. Our results illustrate again the importance of the labor mar-
ket assumptions for policy conclusions. In particular, our conclusions resemble the
ﬁndings of Blanchard and Gali (2005) in showing the challenging consequences of real
wage rigidities for monetary policy.
Efﬁciency wage considerations are potentially an important mechanism to understand
wage rigidity and persistent employment shocks. The effort function in our speciﬁ-
cation of the household problem should be derived from the optimizing behavior of
utility maximizing agents along the lines of Danthine and Kurmann (2005). More re-
search is needed to evaluate the consistency between micro and macro estimates of
these efﬁciency wage considerations.
References
Abowd, John, Robert Creecy, and Francis Kramarz. 2002. “Computing Person and
Firm Effects Using Linked Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data.” Technical Re-
port, Cornell University.
24Akerlof, George. 1982. “Labor contracts as partial gift exchange.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 97:543–569.
Alexopoulos, Michelle. 2004. “Unemployment and the business cycle.” Journal of
Monetary Economics 51:277–298.
Basu, Susanto. 1996. “Procyclical Productivity: Increasing Returns or Cyclical Uti-
lization?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (3): 719–51 (August).
B´ enassy, Jean-Pascal. 2004. “Competitiveness, Market Power and Price Stickiness: A
Paradox and a Resolution.” CEPREMAP.
Bewley, Truman. 1998. “Why not cut pay?” European Economic Review 42:459–490.
Blanchard, Olivier, and Jordi Gali. 2005. “Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keyne-
sian Model.” MIT.
. 2006. “A New Keynesian Model with Unemployment.” MIT.
Blanchﬂower, David G, Andrew J Oswald, and Mario D Garrett. 1990. “InsiderPower
in Wage Determination.” Economica 57 (226): 143–70 (May).
Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. 1993. “Labor Hoarding and
the Business Cycle.” Journal of Political Economy 101 (2): 245–73 (April).
Calvo, Guillermo. 1983. “Staggered Prices in a Utility-maximizing Framework.” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics 12:383–398.
Canzoneri, Matthew, Robert Cumby, and Behzad Diba. 2004. “The cost of nominal
intertia in NNS models.” NBER working paper 10889.
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans. 2005. “Nominal
Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy.” Journal of Po-
litical Economy 113 (1): 1–45.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Robert Vigfusson. 2003, July. “What
HappensAfter a Technology Shock?” Nber working papers9819, National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc.
Collard, Fabrice, and David de la Croix. 2000. “Gift exchange and the business cycle:
the fair wage strikes back.” Review of Economic Dynamics 3 (1): 166–193.
Danthine, Jean-Pierre, and John Donaldson. 1990. “Efﬁciency wages and the business
cycle puzzle.” European Economic Review 34:1275–1301.
Danthine, Jean-Pierre, and Andr´ e Kurmann. 2004. “Fair wages in a New Keynesian
model of the business cycle.” Review of Economic Dynamics 7 (1): 107–142.
. 2005. “The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations.”
Univ Lausanne.
de la Croix, David, and Philippe Michel. 2002. A Theory of Economic Growth: Dynamics
and Policy in Overlapping Generations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gali, Jordi, Mark Gertler, and J. David Lopez-Salido. 2001. “European inﬂation dy-
namics.” European Economic Review 45 (7): 1237–1270.
25. 2005, May. “Markups, Gaps, and the Welfare Costs of Business Fluctuations.”
Economics working papers 836, Department of Economics and Business, Univer-
sitat Pompeu Fabra.
Kiley, Michael. 1997. “Efﬁciency wages, nominal rigidities and the cyclical behavior
of real wages and marginal cost.” Economics Letters 56:215–221.
Levin, Andrew T., Alexei Onatski, John C. Williams, and Noah Williams. 2005, Au-
gust. “Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty in Micro-Founded Macroeconometric
Models.” Nber working papers 11523, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Shapiro, Carl, and Joseph E Stiglitz. 1984. “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker
Discipline Device.” American Economic Review 74 (3): 433–44 (June).
Smets, Frank, and Rafael Wouters. 2003. “An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area.” Journal of the European Economic Association
1 (5): 1123–1175.
. 2005. “Comparing shocks and frictions in US and euro area business cycles:
a Bayesian DSGE Approach.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 20 (2): 161–183.
. 2006. “Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Ap-
proach.” American Economic Review, p. forthcoming.
Solow, Robert. 1979. “Another possible source of wage stickiness.” Journal of Macroe-
conomics 1:79–82.
Yun, Tack. 1996. “Nominal price rigidity, money supply endogeneity, and business
cycles.” Journal of Monetary Economics 2-3:345–370.
26A Proof of Proposition 3
Loglinearizing price equations around the steady state (12) and (14) yield:
ˆ Pt = (1 − ξp) ˆ p⋆
t + ξp ˆ Pt−1 (21)
ˆ Xt = (1 − ξp) ˆ p⋆
t + ξp ˆ Xt−1
which implies that ˆ Pt = ˆ Xt since their initial conditions are the same.




























ˆ wt = Ω ˆ Nt (23)
Effort follows
ˆ e = ψ ˆ w
The output equation leads to:
α(ˆ et + ˆ Nt) = α(1+ ψΩ) ˆ Nt = ˆ Yt −
1
1− θ
( ˆ Xt − ˆ Pt) = ˆ Yt, (24)
Hence, the output changes linked to the difference between ˆ Xt and ˆ Pt disappear in
the linearized version of the model, reﬂecting that this discrepancy has only a second-
order effect (stressed in the welfare analysis carried out by Canzoneri, Cumby, and
Diba (2004)).
And, ﬁnally, the equilibrium on the goods market (15) together with the ﬁrst-order
condition (2) lead to:
ˆ Yt = ˆ Mt − ˆ Pt (25)
Starting from (22) and replacing ˆ ws by its value from (23), ˆ Nt by its value from (24),
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This is equivalent to:
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27We now replace ˆ p⋆
t and ˆ p⋆
t+1 by their value from (21): ˆ p⋆
t = ( ˆ Pt − ξp ˆ Pt−1)/(1 − ξp) and
βξpEt ˆ p⋆
t+1 = βξp(Et ˆ Pt+1 − ξp ˆ Pt)/(1 − ξp):
( ˆ Pt − ξp ˆ Pt−1) = βξp(Et ˆ Pt+1 − ξp ˆ Pt)










( ˆ Mt − ˆ Pt) + (1− αθ) ˆ Pt
 
which simpliﬁes into:
a1( ˆ Pt − ˆ Mt) + a2( ˆ Pt − ˆ Pt−1) + a3( ˆ Pt − Et ˆ Pt+1) = 0
with









, a2 = ξp, a3 = βξp.
Using the method of undetermined coefﬁcients, we can show that the solution is of the
form:





i.e. equation (16) of the main text. ρ is the stable root of
R(ρ) = a3ρ2 − (a1 + a2 + a3)ρ + a2 = 0. (26)
If ψ increases, or if Ω decreases, a1 decreases, which raises price stickiness ρ through
(26).
B The Loglinearized Model
There is a large part of the log-linearized benchmark Smets-Wouters model which is
not affected by the efﬁciency wage assumption. The following linearized equations
are relevant both for the benchmark Smets and Wouters (2005) New Keynesian model
and for its efﬁciency wage variant developed in this paper. The consumption equation

















t − Etˆ εb
t+1
 





βEt ˆ It+1 + ˆ It−1 + ϕ
 
ˆ Qt + ˆ εi
t
  
where ϕ = 1/S
′′
and S(It/It−1) is the investment adjustment cost function incurred in
the case of changes in investment. The corresponding Q equation is given by




− ˆ Rt + (1 − β(1− τ))Etˆ rk
t+1 + β(1 − τ)Et ˆ Qt+1
28while the capital accumulation equation is
ˆ Kt = (1− τ) ˆ Kt−1 + τ
 






and the utilized capital is
ˆ κt = ˆ Kt−1 + ϑˆ rk
t
with ϑ = ϑ′(1)/ϑ′′(1), the inverse of the elasticity of the capital utilization cost func-






























t an i.i.d.-Normal error term
The global demand is the sum of consumption, investment, the cost incurred when




1− τky − gy


















t an i.i.d.-Normal error term
with ky the steady state capital output ratio, gy the steady-state government spending-
output ratio.
The equations relating to the production sector of the model are clearly affected by the
efﬁciency wage assumption. However, for the four following expressions, the bench-
mark Smets and Wouters (2005) linearized model and its efﬁciency wage are only dif-
ferentiated by the presence of the effort variable ˆ et. We only report the linearized ex-
pressions for the efﬁciency wage variant.
Log-linearizing and averaging the production function of the intermediate retailer
ﬁrms, one obtains




ˆ et + ˆ Nt
 




t = ρaˆ εa
t−1 + ηa
t and ηa
t an i.i.d.-Normal error term
As discussed in section 2.2.3, all the intermediate producers share the same wage per
efﬁcient unit of labor and the same capital-efﬁcient labor ratio. Therefore, the labor
demand of the ﬁrms is log-linearized as
ˆ wt − ˆ et = ˆ zt + (1 − α)
 




while the demand of capital is:
ˆ rk
t = ˆ zt − α
 




29The marginal cost equation writes down as
ˆ zt = α   ( ˆ wt − ˆ et) + (1 − α)   ˆ rk
t − ˆ εa
t




[βEt ˆ wt+1 + ˆ wt−1 + βEt ˆ πt+1 + γw ˆ πt−1 − (1+ βγw) ˆ πt]
+
(1 − βξw)(1− ξw)
ξw (1+ β)(1 − ψ)
 
ˆ εa
t + ˆ zt − (1 − α)
 
ˆ et + ˆ Nt − ˆ κt
 







[βEt ˆ wt+1 + ˆ wt−1 + βEt ˆ πt+1 + γw ˆ πt−1 − (1+ βγw) ˆ πt]
+
(1 − βξw)(1− ξw)
ξw (1+ β)
 
σl ˆ Nt +
1
1 − h
  ˆ Ct − ˆ Ct−1
 
− ˆ wt + ˆ εw
t
 
in the benchmark model. One can note that, from the labor demand equation, the term
into square brackets in expression (27) can be re-written as
 
εa
t + ˆ zt − (1 − α)
 
ˆ et + ˆ Nt − ˆ κt
 
− (1 − ψ) ˆ wt
 
= ˆ wtψ − ˆ et
and the RHS corresponds exactly to the log-linearized modiﬁed Solow condition (7).
This means that the Solow condition holds in the long run or if ξw becomes close to
zero. In comparison to the wage equation of the benchmark model, we also remark
that the wage markup shock ˆ εw
t is now replaced by the effort shock ˆ ε
ef
t , both being
ARMA(1,1) processes.
After linearization and averaging, the log-linearized effort in the efﬁciency wage ver-
sion of the model equation writes down as
ˆ et = ˆ wt   (1 − φ3) − ˆ Nt   φ′




















when steady-state effort is ﬁxed at1. Finally, we assume
the following monetary policy reaction function
ˆ Rt = ρ  
  ˆ Rt−1
 
+ (1 − ρ)
 
rπ ˆ πt + ry

















t = ρrˆ εr
t−1 + ηr
t and ηr
t an i.i.d.-Normal error term
30B.1 Loglinearizing the Wage Equation


























−nt+s(j)   Πs−1
l=0π
γw
t+l   π1−γw
 
= 0 (28)
Loglinearizing this FOC around the steady state, we get
(1− ψ) ˆ W⋆








t+s + ˆ Zt+s






We know that the capital-efﬁcient labor ratio is not ﬁrm-speciﬁc and therefore drop the
j index in the optimal wage equation. The latter expression may be re-written as
(1− ψ) ˆ W⋆
t = (1 − βξw)  
 
εa
t + ˆ Zt − (1 − α)(ˆ et + ˆ nt − ˆ κt) − ψ ˆ Pt
 
+ βξw(1 − ψ)
  ˆ W⋆
t+1 − γw ˆ πt
 
Log-linearising expression (20) around steady state, one obtains that
ˆ W⋆
t =
ˆ Wt − ξw ˆ Wt−1 − γwξw ˆ πt−1
1− ξw
.
Substituting for ˆ W⋆



















(1 − βξw)(1− ξw)
(1 − ψ)ξw (1 + β)
 
εa
t + ˆ zt − (1− α)
 
ˆ et + ˆ Nt − ˆ κt
 
− (1− ψ) ˆ wt
 
where ˆ wt and ˆ zt are the real wage and real marginal cost in deviation from steady state.
31B.2 Variants to the Effort Function
We consider here how the introduction of a reference to lagged wage and to labor
productivity affects the model and its loglinearized form. Let us introduce these two




















− (φ0 − φ2 − φ3 − φ4 − φ5)
 
(29)
The introduction of productivity in the effort function affects the labor demand by the
intermediate producers. It is now given by










This is the only relation that is modiﬁed. For the rest, the FOC for capital and for wage
are left unchanged. We can easily check that all the ﬁrms resetting their wage at the
same period choose the same price. Indeed, given the competitive market assumption
























is not ﬁrm speciﬁc. Combining
this information with the expression for labor demand, we can conclude that, as in the
initial efﬁciency wage model, all ﬁrms share the same productivity per efﬁcient unit,
which is enough to prove that intermediate producers setting wage at time t behave
similarly.
Note that combining the labor demand by the ﬁrms (30) with their optimal wage (28)













which Danthine and Kurmann (2005) denote as a modiﬁed Solow condition.
The linearized labor demand (30) expression is
ˆ wt = ˆ zt + (1 − α)
 








































where the steady state employment, wage and production appears. The ﬁrst-order






















= φ1wψ − φ1φ5 (q/N)
ψ
Given that the steady state real return on capital is






+ τ − 1






















Restricting effort level to be equal to unity in steady state yields that the steady state
wage and φ1 are determined by the solution of the two equations system in two un-
knowns formed by the wage expression above and the modiﬁed Solow condition.
C Estimation Results
A limited number of structural parameters, which are very poorly identiﬁed by our
estimation strategy, are ﬁxed at standard values. The discount factor is ﬁxed at 0.99
to reﬂect an average annual real rate of 4 %, the capital share in the Cobb-Douglas
production function is set at 0.24, the quarterly depreciation rate is ﬁxed at 0.025 per
quarter. The share of steady-state consumption in total output is assumed to be 0.65
while the share of steady-state investment is set to 0.17. The parameter capturing the
markup in wage setting is set to 0.5 in the benchmark standard New Keynesian model.
33Table 1: Estimation Results: Benchmark vs Efﬁcient Wage
prior benchmark eff. wage
distrib. mean s.e. mode s.e. mode s. e.
effort ψ beta 0.500 0.150 0.358 0.077
φ′
2 norm 0.500 0.150 0.182 0.084
φ3 norm 0.500 0.150 0.795 0.089
φ4 norm 0.500 0.150 0.000 -
φ5 norm 0.500 0.150 0.000 -
other param invest. adj. cost. norm 4.000 1.500 7.397 0.983 5.590 1.038
sig. cons. utility norm 1.000 0.375 1.161 0.122 1.755 0.255
habit beta 0.700 0.100 0.771 0.034 0.445 0.064
calvo wage beta 0.750 0.050 0.773 0.041 0.780 0.045
sig. labor utility norm 2.000 0.750 2.920 0.577
calvo price beta 0.750 0.050 0.902 0.020 0.892 0.016
index. wage beta 0.500 0.150 0.398 0.125 0.427 0.114
index. price beta 0.500 0.150 0.135 0.061 0.144 0.074
calvo empl. beta 0.500 0.150 0.787 0.019 0.822 0.019
cap. util. adj. cost norm 0.300 0.100 0.432 0.089 0.357 0.096
ﬁxed cost 1+ Φ/Y norm 1.250 0.125 1.440 0.090 1.288 0.105
Taylor rule r inﬂation norm 1.500 0.250 1.648 0.185 1.705 0.151
r lagged int. rate beta 0.750 0.100 0.915 0.016 0.886 0.016
r output-gap norm 0.125 0.050 0.153 0.037 0.206 0.036
r d(output-gap) norm 0.125 0.050 0.147 0.025 0.164 0.028
Constants inﬂation norm 0.625 0.100 0.644 0.100 0.616 0.097
int. rate norm 0.625 0.100 0.618 0.080 0.610 0.084
labor norm 0.100 0.100 0.067 0.015 0.101 0.023
trend norm 0.400 0.100 0.328 0.076 0.554 0.023
shocks: AR productivity beta 0.750 0.150 0.999 0.001 0.997 0.003
risk premium beta 0.750 0.150 0.717 0.058 0.873 0.034
gov. spending beta 0.750 0.150 0.998 0.002 0.997 0.002
investment beta 0.750 0.150 0.910 0.038 0.934 0.021
interest rate beta 0.750 0.150 0.405 0.074 0.301 0.068
price markup beta 0.750 0.150 0.963 0.033 0.767 0.065
wage m-up/effort beta 0.750 0.150 0.961 0.012 0.968 0.012
shocks: MA investment beta 0.750 0.150 0.887 0.065 0.863 0.039
price markup beta 0.750 0.150 0.863 0.038 0.597 0.116
wage m-up/effort beta 0.750 0.150 0.863 0.045 0.947 0.017
shocks: CO ρag norm 0.200 0.100 0.142 0.037 0.219 0.046
shocks: SE productivity invg 0.100 2.000 0.778 0.099 0.613 0.080
risk premium invg 0.100 2.000 0.102 0.016 0.077 0.012
gov. spending invg 0.100 2.000 0.331 0.021 0.312 0.019
investment invg 0.100 2.000 0.567 0.045 0.534 0.047
interest rate invg 0.100 2.000 0.146 0.011 0.152 0.011
price markup invg 0.100 2.000 0.154 0.027 0.191 0.024
wage m-up/effort invg 0.100 2.000 0.160 0.021 0.184 0.019
Log data density -440.425 -432.321
posterior mode 345.032 328.781
34Table 2: Estimation Results: Alternative Speciﬁcations
eff. Wage φ4 > 0 eff. Wage φ5 > 0
mode std. dev. mode std. dev.
effort ψ 0.364 0.074 0.350 0.093
φ′
2 0.182 0.074 0.197 0.081
φ3 0.790 0.082 0.700 0.088
φ4 -0.012 0.007 0.000 -
φ5 0.000 - 0.125 0.060
other param invest. adj. cost. 5.637 1.016 5.217 1.060
sig. cons. utility 1.678 0.252 1.661 0.256
habit 0.466 0.063 0.451 0.063
calvo wage 0.783 0.043 0.782 0.039
calvo price 0.897 0.016 0.928 0.015
index. wage 0.426 0.111 0.372 0.111
index. price 0.144 0.064 0.142 0.067
calvo empl. 0.824 0.018 0.851 0.020
cap. util. adj. cost 0.349 0.095 0.333 0.097
ﬁxed cost 1+ Φ/Y 1.250 0.104 1.355 0.110
Taylor rule r inﬂation 1.674 0.154 1.346 0.196
r lagged int. rate 0.888 0.016 0.875 0.020
r output-gap 0.210 0.035 0.241 0.036
r d(output-gap) 0.170 0.027 0.156 0.029
Constants inﬂation 0.620 0.097 0.610 0.097
int. rate 0.608 0.085 0.627 0.087
labor -0.093 0.026 0.056 0.032
trend 0.566 0.025 0.547 0.019
shocks: AR productivity 0.996 0.003 0.995 0.005
risk premium 0.877 0.033 0.887 0.038
gov. spending 0.998 0.002 0.998 0.002
investment 0.933 0.020 0.937 0.020
interest rate 0.297 0.066 0.313 0.069
price markup 0.777 0.064 0.821 0.073
wage m-up/effort 0.965 0.013 0.966 0.011
shocks: MA investment 0.861 0.038 0.834 0.041
price markup 0.620 0.110 0.726 0.111
wage m-up/effort 0.940 0.021 0.941 0.020
shocks: CO ρag 0.214 0.044 0.198 0.040
shocks: SE productivity 0.649 0.084 0.685 0.096
risk premium 0.074 0.011 0.077 0.012
gov. spending 0.311 0.019 0.311 0.019
investment 0.534 0.046 0.513 0.044
interest rate 0.152 0.011 0.149 0.011
price markup 0.189 0.023 0.190 0.022
wage m-up/effort 0.180 0.020 0.188 0.019
Log data density -439.371 -429.441
posterior mode 331.376 325.028
35Table 3: Estimation Results: Alternative Speciﬁcations
eff. Wage φ3 = 1 eff. Wage diff. prior
mode std. dev. mode std. dev.
effort ψ 0.234 0.061 0.305 0.001
φ′
2 0.287 0.073 0.007 0.005
φ3 1.000 - 0.701 0.005
φ4 0.000 - 0.000 -
φ5 0.000 - 0.000 -
other param invest. adj. cost. 5.506 0.999 5.608 1.001
sig. cons. utility 1.810 0.253 1.693 0.243
habit 0.444 0.066 0.457 0.063
calvo wage 0.807 0.032 0.295 0.068
calvo price 0.883 0.018 0.896 0.018
index. wage 0.480 0.115 0.403 0.109
index. price 0.120 0.055 0.148 0.067
calvo empl. 0.829 0.017 0.818 0.021
cap. util. adj. cost 0.370 0.094 0.340 0.092
ﬁxed cost 1+ Φ/Y 1.343 0.102 1.225 0.100
Taylor rule r inﬂation 1.735 0.150 1.690 0.158
r lagged int. rate 0.885 0.017 0.888 0.016
r output-gap 0.205 0.037 0.204 0.035
r d(output-gap) 0.160 0.027 0.166 0.028
Constants inﬂation 0.613 0.097 0.617 0.097
int. rate 0.609 0.082 0.611 0.085
labor 0.099 0.028 0.096 0.024
trend 0.570 0.024 0.551 0.022
shocks: AR productivity 0.997 0.002 0.997 0.003
risk premium 0.853 0.036 0.877 0.035
gov. spending 0.997 0.002 0.998 0.002
investment 0.940 0.022 0.935 0.021
interest rate 0.307 0.068 0.298 0.067
price markup 0.795 0.062 0.767 0.065
wage m-up/effort 0.965 0.018 0.966 0.012
shocks: MA investment 0.880 0.037 0.856 0.041
price markup 0.591 0.111 0.606 0.112
wage m-up/effort 0.940 0.026 0.945 0.017
shocks: CO ρag 0.218 0.045 0.197 0.039
shocks: SE productivity 0.629 0.079 0.672 0.078
risk premium 0.081 0.012 0.076 0.012
gov. spending 0.314 0.020 0.313 0.019
investment 0.543 0.048 0.525 0.046
interest rate 0.152 0.011 0.152 0.011
price markup 0.181 0.023 0.193 0.022
wage m-up/effort 0.182 0.021 0.183 0.019
Log data density -428.651 -444.848
posterior mode 327.397 331.174
36D Impulse Response Functions
The impulse response functions are calculated for a one standard error shock and with
the model parameters evaluated at the mode of the posterior distribution.
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Note: Grey line: benchmark model. Black line: Fair wage model.
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Note: Grey line: benchmark model. Black line: Fair wage model.
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Note: Grey line: benchmark model. Black line: Fair wage model.
40Figure 6: IRF for a productivity shock with monetary policy targeting the natural ver-
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Note: Black line: outcome under natural output gap targeting (dotted lines represent target natural
output and employment).
Grey line: outcome under efﬁcient output gap targeting (dotted lines represent target efﬁcient output
and employment).
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